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Executive Summary  
 
Even before its announced completion date of 2018, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to 
regional missile defense in Europe can declare victory. So far it has been implemented close to schedule 
and below budget despite continuing problems related to cost, debates about financial burden sharing, and 
Russia’s warnings about its threat, real or imagined, to European security and stability. Russian aggression 
in Crimea and Ukraine and its intervention in Syria have helped to shore up broad political support for the 
project. The sharp tension trajectory of Russian-NATO relations and the need to reassure Eastern European 
allies does however mean that Russia and a few domestic critics will continue to see EPAA as a political 
lever to stoke the fires of uncertainty about U.S. commitment and to play on the fears in Eastern Europe of 
abandonment in their first hours of need should a Russian attack occur. 
 
Expansion of the EPAA’s capabilities beyond the current projected capability of the system by 2018 will be 
difficult given the costs and the competing demands for missile defense assets elsewhere around the globe. 
Barring any significant ratcheting up of Russian threats and other security risks in Europe, significant 
expansion of the EPAA is unlikely, but so is any reduction in commitment to the project as it stands now.  
 
However, there are many assumptions and challenges still to be discussed and confronted if EPAA is to 
fulfill all of the political and military expectations set first by the George W. Bush administration and the 
revised version under the Obama administration. This essay will examine each of these challenges in turn, 
and gauge the seriousness of the dangers and risks, both political and military, involved. There is little 
present evidence that the EPAA is at risk of drastic changes to its planned deployment, either in favor of 
increased capability or a decreased U.S. commitment to fulfilling the promises already made. This is as it 
should be. The EPAA, to quote Brad Roberts, is not a “fool’s errand.”i What remains to be seen is how the 
United States and NATO will address the challenges, old and new, that face the EPAA and indeed all 





The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), the missile defense network deployed 
through NATO and designed to defend Europe from limited ballistic missile attack, seems to 
have met almost all of its success metrics that were outlined in its initial plans under George W. 
Bush in 2007 and the revisions made by the Obama administration in 2009.ii With minimal 
difficulty, it has won most of its bureaucratic and Congressional battles within the United States 
and within formal and informal NATO sessions.iii Four Aegis-class destroyers have been 
permanently assigned to Rota, Spain, providing the EPAA’s sea-based component. The first 
Aegis Ashore system in Romania was declared operational in May 2016, and a similar 
deployment in Poland will likely be completed according to schedule in 2018. Integration with 
NATO’s Early Warning and Communications Systems through a new inclusive headquarters at 
Ramstein, Germany, and a new command at USNAVEUR at Naples are well underway. Major 
refitting of earlier Aegis vessels with supporting radars and also the active involvement of five 
major allies at sea, Spain, Norway, Holland, Italy, and the UK, are assured through the Maritime 
Theater Missile Defense Forum. 
 
Moreover, there have been a wide range of NATO and American training and integration 
exercises for EPAA, all completed at or above the satisfactory range.iv Given the threat of 
Russian aggression in Eastern and Central Europe and the impact of the Syrian civil conflict, the 
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reassurance value of the EPAA has increased. These negative trends in the international 
environment have increased EPAA’s value as a tool for developing popular confidence and 
psychological reassurance, especially since EPAA has come to be recognized not only for its 
protection against rogue missiles or unauthorized use, but also as a symbol of American 
commitment to Europe’s security.  
 
In contrast to earlier periods, all this has happened with a minimum amount of discussion and 
popular debate, let alone active political opposition. Russia’s behavior has certainly played a role 
in reducing criticism for the project, particularly in Eastern Europe, where the desire for greater 
American involvement in security affairs and for new evidence of full American commitment to 
their security has reached new highs. American public opinion has been more muted. But the 
consensus that any form of missile defense is a “good thing” and the chosen answer to any 
emerging crises remains strong, particularly among the relatively small and informal “missile 
defense caucus” in the House and the more assertive bloc of missile defense senators,v who may 
have greater influence with the new Republican administration than they did under the Obama 
administration. This is true even when the knowledge on Capitol Hill about specifics is generally 
lacking. 
 
The relatively smooth implementation of the EPAA so far is welcome news, although problems 
do remain along several key dimensions. After some initial flurries, these have largely not 
attracted direct attention given the distraction first of Europe’s financial crisis and now the 
unprecedented refugee waves, continuing fiscal uncertainties, and the new divisions within the 
EU framework. But these problems remain––problems that will affect the future of the EPAA 
and the entire integrated air and missile defense mission within Europe as well as signal likely 
difficulties with missile defense architectures in other regions of the world. Some are familiar 
from earlier BMD episodes: the inherent difficulty of missile defense still poses challenges, as do 
questions of cost-benefit and economic feasibility. Some challenges, however, are new, such as 
the ambiguous cost-benefit trade-offs involved in land-based deployments versus those at sea, 
competition with the BMD needs of other regions, and the suitability of a new range of 
capabilities under the new “third offset” strategy such as the long awaited rail-gun or the multi-
mission explosive rounds fitting a variety of already deployed Navy tubes.  
 
Last, but presently perhaps the most overwhelming, is the question of the special psychological 
impact of EPAA in the impending collapse of the European security structure that no longer 
seems to assume any active Russian involvement, or even grudging Russian acceptance. The 
immediate political mobilization effects hearten many decision makers, and public opinion 
continues to have little confidence in Russian words or behavior. But there are sober questions 
about long-term developments, from both military and political critics. Is EPAA “worth it,” in 
European or transatlantic terms, given scarce resources and a host of long postponed military 
requirements? Does EPAA have enough credibility with external foes? Do domestic populations 
see missile defense as an operational answer to renewed pressure, harassment, and low level 
escalation from infiltration, as seen in Crimea or Ukraine? 
 
This essay will examine each of these challenges in turn, and gauge the seriousness of the 
dangers and risks, both political and military, involved. The EPAA does not seem in imminent 
danger of major changes, either in favor of increased capability or a decreased U.S. commitment 
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to fulfilling the promises already made. This is as it should be. What remains to be seen is how 
the United States and NATO will address the challenges, old and new, that face the EPAA.  
 
 
The EPAA and Europe’s Slide into Turmoil  
 
The political ease with which the EPAA has been implemented so far owes a great deal to 
Europe’s focus on other, more pressing issues and to Russia’s belligerency, which shows no sign 
of abetting. Since the onset of the Great Recession in 2008, Europe as a whole has befallen tough 
economic times. The Eurozone debt crisis and the lack of economic opportunity across the 
continent have consumed the lion’s share of attention among European governments. The 
economic hardship across Europe has also sparked questions about the feasibility of the 
European Union as nationalism and populism continue to grow. In this chaotic environment, the 
European public has paid far less attention to U.S.-led security initiatives in Europe than it had 
during the Cold War. This is especially so because the United States is providing most of the 
funds for the project. If European defense budgets had to noticeably increase to fund the project, 
the EPAA would have likely been met with more opposition.  
 
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, belligerent rhetoric, and muscle flexing in Syria provided 
increased rationale for Eastern European countries to support EPAA and particularly to covet a 
permanent U.S. ground presence on their territory. In fact, enthusiasm for EPAA has much more 
to do with the intrinsic requirement for a “persistent” presence of U.S. forces in Eastern Europe 
than it does with protection from medium-range ballistic missiles, in the eyes of most Eastern 
Europeans. This has decreased the European criticism of the project that plagued the George W. 
Bush administration’s efforts. This is both a blessing and a curse. On the positive side, Russia’s 
actions have made the EPAA’s progress much easier to execute politically. European leaders 
need not worry about domestic opposition to the project stemming from concerns about 
provoking Russia.  
 
The flip side to this decrease in political opposition is that there may be greater demand for 
missile defense (and other forms of U.S. commitments that involve the stationing of U.S. assets 
and forces in Eastern Europe) that the United States may not wish to provide for reasons of 
optics and competition for BMD resources in other regions of the world. The demand for greater 
missile defense alone could cause substantial tension with Russia, and provide them with the 
justification they need, for example, to exit the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. They 
will claim, as they have already done, that the EPAA is simply laying the groundwork for a more 
robust missile defense capability that will in the near future threaten Russia’s strategic deterrent 
and its ability to strike Europe with its ICBMs. Even if the United States withholds such support 
for the increased missile defense requested by allies, Russia will surely use the support for 
further EPAA capabilities for propaganda purposes. It will also play into the paranoia that lurks 
in the background at the Kremlin.  
 
From this perspective, the lack of opposition to the EPAA—and the potential for increased 
demands and expectations down the road—could complicate U.S. and NATO relations with 
Russia even further, and be used by Russia as a justification to advance its agenda on the INF 
Treaty, for its persistent (and irresponsible) use of military aircraft and vessels to provoke and 
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irritate, and perhaps to claim ever greater “rights” over its near abroad. The present Russian 
government is clearly probing at all the edges of the previous security regime in Europe, as well 
as questioning or outright rejecting the basic agreements that undergirded that regime—no 
change of borders by force, respect for international law, and no permanent military deployments 
outside of national soil. While Putin’s Russia has not committed massive force or pursued new 
strategic directions, these circumstances bode ill for any easy or speedy return to a strategic 
partnership with the United States or Europe towards the goals set by Ronald Reagan and 
Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 at Reykjavik, “a Europe whole and free.”vi  
 
 
The Persistence of Familiar Problems 
 
Since the change of plans regarding the Third Site and the introduction of the phased adaptive 
approach policy, the EPAA has proceeded according to plan with far fewer hiccups than other 
comparable BMD programs.vii That being said, many of the same issues that characterized 
previous missile defense debates are beginning to appear again, though they have not yet been 
grappled with to the extent necessary due to Europe’s preoccupation with more pressing 
problems.  
 
One of these familiar problems is the question of cost. The complex nature of U.S. missile 
defense funding makes the true cost of missile defense to the United States difficult to calculate. 
Costs stemming from research and development, acquisition, and operations and maintenance 
are all associated with missile defense, even though these costs may be spread across different 
departments and programs. In addition, some programs have multiple purposes while other 
elements of the missile defense budget, such as surveillance and tracking, exist within the 
classified portions of the defense budget. Despite these complexities, when considered within the 
broader context of U.S. defense spending, missile defense makes up a relatively small and 
reasonable percentage of the overall defense budget. While the relative size of U.S. missile 
defense spending is modest, perceptions about the contributions of missile defense to U.S. 
security and strategic objectives will be what is most critical in determining the role of missile 
defense in the future.viii  
 
Estimating the costs of the EPAA has proven to be difficult as well. While the Defense 
Department has made lifetime operating and support cost estimates for the forward based radar 
and terminal high altitude defense (THAAD) systems, it has struggled to put forth a 
comprehensive cost estimate for Aegis Ashore.ix  
 
Funding for the Aegis BMD program comes mainly from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 
budget, with a smaller portion coming from the Naval budget. MDA’s budget includes funds for 
the two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania that are to be part of the EPAA.x 
Burden-sharing is another cost related issue that has arisen for the EPAA. Some observers have 
called for an increased investment in regional BMD from European members of NATO. Since 
the primary purpose of the EPAA is to protect Europe, they argue that the Europeans should 
share more of these costs.xi However, missile defense is no military industrial bonanza and 
doesn’t provide technology transfer incentives for allies.  
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The Emergence of New Problems  
 
In addition to the old set of problems that would accompany a greater demand for BMD in 
Eastern Europe vis-à-vis Russia, the EPAA also faces new challenges that will need to be 
addressed over the coming years.   
 
Demand for missile defense is increasing, both within the U.S. military and among allies. As the 
Aegis BMD system has proven itself, combatant commanders have demonstrated an interest in 
having a BMD capability in their theater. This has placed a great amount of stress on the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy. To meet the requests of combatant commanders for 
missile defense, the Navy would need to allocate 77 Aegis ships to the BMD mission out of a 
total fleet of 84 Aegis ships.xii Most Aegis ships cannot currently perform this missile defense 
mission and other missions (such as cruise missile defense) simultaneously, meaning that 
meeting the BMD wishes of combatant commanders would prevent Aegis ships from performing 
other critical functions. In short, the Navy is currently unable to meet the demand for sea-based 
missile defense.   
 
This has increased the Navy’s enthusiasm for Aegis Ashore.xiii If further capability is added to 
the EPAA, the most cost-effective and militarily advantageous mix of sea-based and land-based 
Aegis deployments will need to be found. Sea-based and land-based Aegis missile defenses both 
have their strengths and weaknesses. Sea-based missile defense has the benefit of being able to 
defend ships from anti-ship missiles—a growing concern particularly in the Asia-Pacific. Sea-
based BMD is also mobile, allowing for a surge of BMD assets into conflict zones should the 
need arise. But these benefits are accompanied by significant drawbacks. As mentioned 
previously, most Aegis ships cannot perform BMD and cruise missile defense simultaneously, 
making the ships susceptible to an attack from both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles at the 
same time. Furthermore, the vertical launch system (VLS) on Aegis ships that launch the 
interceptors cannot be reloaded at sea, meaning a large salvo of incoming missiles could deplete 
the interceptors quickly and leave the ship and surrounding ships defenseless.xiv Land-based 
Aegis Ashore batteries can be reloaded with greater ease, but are not mobile and thus cannot be 
moved where they are needed most. The problem of allocating between land-based and sea-
based assets in a matter that meets operational requirements without breaking the Navy’s budget 
is a new challenge that will need to be managed over time.    
 
In addition to managing the allocation between land-based and sea-based assets, it will be 
imperative to limit the number of missiles that missile defenses will have to intercept in the first 
place. This is for three main reasons. First, sea-based missile defenses are limited by the number 
of interceptors they can carry onboard. Second, adversary arsenals are increasing in size, such 
that the volume of incoming missiles from a determined adversary would be sufficient to 
overwhelm missile defenses. And third, the current inventory of interceptors is costly, putting 
further strain on a military budget that has other modernization priorities.  
 
As the EPAA continues to evolve, so too will operational doctrines designed to reduce the 
number of incoming missiles. This will require the integration of other capabilities into the 
missile defense system, including non-kinetic capabilities designed to disrupt the launching of 
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ballistic missiles. There has also been talk of “left of zero” attacks, or striking an adversary’s 
missiles before they are launched. Advancements in precision-guided munitions and intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) have made such a comprehensive approach feasible.   
 
Advancements in precision and accuracy are also causing the defense establishment to look at 
creating new capabilities to augment or even eventually replace the current expensive and 
limited missile defense assets deployed today, such as moving toward the SM-6 or 5-inch guns to 
utilize existing and developing military technology for new uses. The Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is also working on developing artillery shells (which could 
potentially be launched by guns on naval ships) that would “combine the guidance, precision and 
accuracy generally afforded by missiles with the speed, rapid-fire capability and large 
ammunition capacity afforded by bullets.”xv 
 
Nearly seventy years of research has revealed a greater sense of technological limits in meeting 
the Aegis-based components of the current ballistic missile defense architecture. First, there is 
need for improved intra-defense communication and coordination to progressively integrate the 
various elements of the U.S. missile defense programs with allies and partners, not to mention 
the need for improved interoperability between U.S. BMD systems.xvi Second, the Aegis ships 
that are the backbone of EPAA cannot operate in a short time window without pre-delegation 
and, as of yet, cannot fulfill both the air defense and the missile defense mission at the same 
time. And third, there is need for stronger and larger radars mounted on naval vessels netted to 
the Aegis system to avoid the inconsistencies in cueing, as the current antennae cannot look on 
two levels simultaneously.  
 
In addition to the technical decisions on the configuration of land-based assets, the defense of 
Aegis Ashore sites while preventing escalation needs to be considered. In the current political 
context, what would be permissible under the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 
Cooperation, and Security between the Russian Federation and NATO if Russia threatened to 
attack an Aegis Ashore site? 
 
Beyond such a speculative scenario, the increasing tensions in Eastern Europe following 
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have increased the political support for EPAA, particularly among 
the Visegrad countries. In response, EPAA’s impact, if there is any, on Russia’s “escalate to 





The EPAA has already served a useful purpose within the NATO alliance. Its implementation is 
now a barometer of U.S. support for NATO, particularly its Eastern European members. 
Therefore, decreasing support for its stated objectives or failure to continue to implement the 
EPAA’s next steps will result in a perception that the United States is decreasing its support for 
Europe’s security at a time of significant threat and peril. It is thus necessary for the United 
States to fulfill its promises under the EPAA and work to achieve the capability that it promises, 
while recognizing that the main benefit of the EPAA to U.S. security guarantees is its ground 
presence.  
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However, an expansion of the EPAA’s capabilities, whether promoted by the United States or its 
European allies, could prove further damaging to already failing U.S.-Russian relations. As 
tempting as it may be, the EPAA should not be used as a leverage point with the Russians, lest it 
provide them with an excuse to enact their agenda or needlessly provoke the paranoid officials in 
the Kremlin, some of whom genuinely believe that Russia is “permanently encircled.”xvii  
If indeed further demonstrations of American security commitments to its allies are needed, other 
methods should be found. Some measures that the United States could take to credibly assure 
allies could include increasing transparency, maintaining open channels of communication, and 
support for Track 1.5 and Track 2 meetings. 
 
It should also be noted that the EPAA will not by itself address the security threats facing Europe 
today. Following the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine, the pressing issue in 
Eastern Europe is Russia’s use of hybrid warfare, unmarked Special Forces that became the 
infamous “little green men,” and Russia’s “salami tactics” to overcome opposition. It is unclear 
what level of NATO and American commitment is necessary to assuage Europe’s fears over 
Russia’s aggressive posture.  
 
These security threats are exacerbated by the ongoing economic and political crises across 
Europe that began as sovereign debt crises in the Eurozone and led to the rise of support for 
Euroskeptic parties and eventually Brexit. The migrant crisis that originated from Syrian 
refugees, combined with rise of xenophobia, homegrown radicalism, and terrorist attacks in 
Europe, has left the Schengen system of open borders shaken. Overall, these combined factors of 
stress threaten the EU framework, in which the divide between the net contributors and net 
receivers have deepened.  
 
It is thus critical for the United States to focus more of its foreign policy agenda on Europe in 
ways that address not just the perception of American security guarantees—as the EPAA does—
but the actual substance of the threats facing Europe. The new administration should continue 
with the plans already agreed to with the EPAA, but find other additional methods for making 
American security guarantees credible. The United States must also realize that missile defense 
will not serve as a substitute for tactical nuclear weapons in Europe or for a strong U.S. nuclear 





While the future resilience of missile defense programs will depend on critical technological 
development, budgets, and political alliances, the EPAA has secured enough capital and political 
support to survive. However, neither a significant increase in capability nor a drastic decrease in 
U.S. commitment to European allies in fulfilling the promises already made are likely. The 
political support for EPAA’s legitimacy, particularly among the Central and Eastern European 
allies, remains high in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. 
 
There are several decisions awaiting the new U.S. administration on missile defense and its role 
in transatlantic relations. Taking the strategic implications, costs, and technological needs behind 
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these decisions into consideration, the administration will have to balance between national 
missile defense programs and layered regional systems. The prospects for long-term success in 
regional missile defense goals with the EPAA depend on overcoming the old and new challenges 
on the adequacy of the technology, schedules, funding priorities, and burden sharing. How the 
United States and Europe tackle these challenges will have important implications for European 
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